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some observations relating
to future european debates
Jean-Marie Cheffert
article:
The universal service issue is one of the concerns of the European Commission’s 1999
Review. Several questions, such as the extension of the scope and the funding of universal
service, are raised in this article. This contribution first provides a framework identifying the
logic of the universal service policy. Several proposals are then made, some of them going
beyond the Commission position. These proposals are not focused on the question of the
scope of universal service: they are related to some practical and sometimes neglected
questions. The article suggests not to rely on the subsidiarity principle in some of these
practical matters and shows that too much subsidiarity could damage European competition
and could prevent member states from having effective tools in order to perform their
universal service policy.
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Just as the telecommunications sector is undergoing a process of
liberalization, the concept of universal service has made a remarkable
reappearance.This policy enables the sector to open up to competition,
while guaranteeing regulation of the market via a monitoring policy.
Born under a sign of consensus, the concept is now passing into fact
in Europe: member states have opened their telecommunications
markets up to competition and possess the legal tools which can
guarantee, in voice telephony (the current scope of universal service), a
service of quality, available to all at an affordable price.
However, the debates linked to universal service policy implementation
are not closed.Thus, just before the adoption of a new Directive bearing
exclusively on this theme, the 1999 Review poses a series of questions.2
Should we extend the scope of universal service, an essentially
evolutionary concept, and if so, according to what criteria? How do
national funding schemes function? Can we, in Europe, take the idea of
affordability further?
From reading the 1999 Review, the debate seems primarily, though
not exclusively, to focus on the scope of the universal service.The review
takes as its departure point the idea that member states themselves may,
within the current framework, and respecting the principles of
transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality, draw up the actual
schemes whose major lines are defined in the Communication of 27
November 1996.3
If we want an effective universal service policy, and if we want the
debate on its scope to make sense, it is necessary to look more closely at
the particular modalities relating to the practical organization of this
policy. Member states have perhaps been left too much room to
manoeuvre with regard to some practical issues such as designation and
remuneration of operators and funding policy. Some precise rules within
these areas would surely improve the efficiency of universal service
policies, without necessarily withdrawing the authority of member
states to engage specifically in national policy making. In other words,
the essentially evolving debate on scope, if it is to avoid becoming
vacuous, must involve a debate on the system itself.
Universal service policy
The opening up of the telecommunications sector to
competition has the same objectives of quality, availability
and affordability as are targeted by universal service policy.
Yet, despite this, the telecommunications sector retains its
particularity. It is a sector of considerable social importance:
it includes essential services and it is also the bearer of those
political expectations symbolized by the term information
society.The telecommunications market has, furthermore, a
particular structure: it is naturally segmented, and its
technology tends to favour a concentration of companies.
The sector is therefore accompanied by a policy of
safeguard: universal service policy.
The 26 February 1998 Directive defined the current
scope of universal service.4 It covers public and private voice
telephony, directory services and some reductions in favour
of disabled users and people with social needs.5 The various
elements of this policy may be financed from within the
telecommunication sector itself. However, for various
1. The author has developed some of the
ideas presented in this article in greater
detail in ‘Service Universel, Concurrence
et Télécommunications’ (Universal
service, competition and
telecommunications), Cahier du CRID 
No 15, Story Scientia, 1999. 
2. The 1999 Communications Review:
Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions COM (1999) 539.
3. Commission Communication on
Assessment Criteria for National Schemes
for the Cost and Financing of Universal
Service in Telecommuinications and
Guidelines for the Member States on
Operation of such Schemes COM (96) 608,
27 November 1996.
4. Directive 98/10/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 1998 on the application of open
network provision (ONP) to voice
telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive
environment, OJ, 1–4 April,1998.
5. Reductions for schools, libraries and
hospitals are excluded from this scope.
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societal reasons, member states may decide to vary the scope of universal
service policy (see relation 1, Figure 1).The Directive says that ‘Member
States may impose additional requirements concerning the provision of
telecommunication services…Such additional requirements…may not
be financed from a mandatory contribution by market players’. It is
important to understand that the universal service scope defined in this
Directive merely identifies the policy which may be financed from
within the telecommunications sector itself.
To achieve the objectives of quality, availability and affordability in the
services under consideration, member states enact the policies shown in
Figure 1: a price policy, a quality policy, the organization of non-
profitable activities (the geographical component of universal service)
and the establishment of preferential tariffs (the social component of
universal service).These policies have a direct impact (see relations 6 and
7, Figure 1) on the telecommunications market; they also represent a
cost: operators providing these services are reimbursed at a fair, which
means non-discriminatory, price. The funding policy (mandatory
contributions by the market players) will finance this cost. Such fiscal
pressure on the sector will, however, in turn influence the market (see
relation 9). Prices will go up and consumer behaviour will be affected.
The different areas – identified in Figure 1 – of universal service
policy must be organized with respect to the competitive environment.
If competition acts as a constraint on universal service policy, it is also a
lever: market forces can be used to better guarantee the attainment of
the targeted goals.We may already note that the review, by encouraging
Figure 1: Universal service policy.
Quality policy
Universal
service
cost
Funding
policy
Determination
of the scope:
determination
of the list of
services and,
for each, the
goals to be
attained
Pricing policy
Designation policy
Remuneration policy
Designation policy
Reductions
Non-profitable activities
Remuneration policy
Reality in the telecommunications sector
Competition (policy)
Quality
1
2
3
6 9
7
84
5
Affordability
Specific
affordability
Availability Fiscal
pressure
Choices to be made
Consequences of choices
universal service
some observations relating to future european debates
244
the development of mechanisms where ‘play or pay’ is implemented,
clearly takes this perspective: use of competition is suggested in the
process of designation of operators who are to supply universal service.6
Pushing this idea of a linkage with competition a little further, it seems
that other areas of universal service policies can be analysed and
discussed in this light.
Determining the scope of universal service
When determining the scope of universal service, society is confronted
with its responsibilities. By means of arbitration, goals are balanced and
priorities defined. This is clear in cases where financing comes from
sources external to the sector: national and regional budgets are limited
and a universal service policy finds itself in competition with other
needs and policies. This arbitration should also precede cases where
financing is from within the sector. Basically, although such financing
appears less onerous for society as a whole, this is merely an illusion. If
the sector is solicited, via mandatory contributions, as a source for the
funding of universal service, an eviction effect may be observed: sector
prices will go up and consumption will go down. Allowing universal
service policy to be dictated by the effect of a single trend is therefore
clearly to be avoided: the real needs of society should be identified. One
can therefore understand why the review pleads for periodic review on
societal needs and proposes to define some precise criteria with a view
to extending the scope of universal service.
We must note that a universal service policy, when supported by the
budgetary resources of the member state, has a lighter depressive effect
on the telecommunications sector. In such a case, the eviction effect
would lightly affect the whole economy, rather than just the sector itself.
The budgetary realism of the member states is, however (at least in the
short term), a constraint on such financing.
Non-profitable activities
Certain activities, which are by nature non-profitable due to their cost,
will not be spontaneously offered. A typical case is that of service to
clients living in low density areas.These activities will therefore need to
be organized if we wish to achieve the goal of availability.
In conformity with the subsidiarity principle, two logical ways are
open: either the authority imposes this service on one or more
operators, or it opens a public tender. These two methods must be in
harmony with the competitive environment.7
According to the Communication of 27th November 1996:
…there should not be an automatic assumption that the current universal service
provider must continue to provide universal service or to be the only provider…It
will remain important within any scheme to ensure that incentives are provided
to encourage cost-efficient delivery of universal service…One way of achieving
this may be to place elements of universal services out to tender…the tender being
awarded to the organization offering to provide a service of specified quality at
the lowest level of subsidy.
This preoccupation with using market forces to minimize the
burden of universal service can also be found in the review.
Note that the term ‘play or pay’ (defined in the review as the
fact that operators may reduce their contributions if they
6. This point will be developed further.
7. Annexe D of the 27 November 1996
Communication (reference above) classes
the policy of designation within the
‘aspects of national regimes to be
definitely carried out at a national level’.
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provide universal service) is inappropriate. In fact, such a reduction in
contribution is observed also when universal service is imposed on an
operator. It is better to speak explicitly of tendering.
Recourse to tendering seems appropriate, at least as soon as competition
is effective.This mechanism enables the cost of universal service to be kept
as low as possible, thus minimizing the distortion observed in the
telecommunications market (which finances the burden). Moreover, this
system avoids complicated calculations of net cost. Indeed, this amount
should be extracted on the basis of the operator’s accounts. In the case of a
public tender, the amount is revealed by the procedure itself.
I thus support the review on this point. Neither should we neglect the
concrete difficulties of such a tendering procedure. If the member states
are expected to advance along this road, some European guidelines
would be welcome in a future Communication.
The organization of reductions
A member state may legitimately wish certain users to benefit from
reductions.The allowance is defined here as the fact of billing the service
to certain users at a price below that which would have been generated
by market conditions.8 As we see, the nature of the provision is different
to that of non-profitable activities outlined above. In particular,
operators are required to make a reduction for all users fulfilling certain
criteria (eg the disabled and the poor) independent of whether the
service is profitable at the full price or not.
This type of provision imposes particular designation and
remuneration policies. Indeed, the choice no longer presents itself as in
the alternative presented above (obligation v invitation to tender).The
review and the 1996 Communication ignore this specific point. A
simple example is presented below to clarify these views.
Remuneration policy
The inadequacy, in the case of reductions, of a remuneration policy
based on the concept of pure net cost, namely costs of provision of the
service minus reduced revenues.
Let us suppose that an operator is obliged to make a 50% reduction
for the disabled. Suppose that two of his clients each represent, at full
price, a revenue of 100. Assume also that the cost of serving them is
identical, let us say they are neighbours, and represents a sum of 70. One
of these clients is disabled and benefits from a reduction: to the operator
he then represents a revenue of 50 rather than 100. If the operator is
compensated for the net cost of this service to the disabled customer, he
will receive 20 (cost 70–50 invoiced) from the universal service fund.
This poses two problems. First, the operator will regard the disabled
customer differently: he is less profitable.This customer earns him 70 (50
in revenues plus 20 in universal service fund compensation), which is
exactly what he costs. His neighbour, however, brings in a profit of 30
(revenues 100 – costs 70).The reader can see that our reasoning functions
at other cost levels.9 If the disabled person is seen as less
profitable, then the operator will be less interested in attracting
his custom.This is certainly an undesirable effect which risks
rebounding against the measure’s primary objective.
The second problem is of a methodological nature.
Remuneration based on the net cost involves knowing the
exact cost of serving each customer entitled to a reduction.
8. These conditions include elements of
policy such as price regulation.
9. If the cost were 40, the fund would not
intervene because, with a profit of 50,
there would no longer be a net cost. The
disabled client would generate a profit 10
(50–40) and the other client a profit 60
(100–40), that is, more than the first.
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This is practically impossible, involving as it does periodically reviewable
accounting hypotheses based on the cost of the average privileged customer.
We may respond to both these objections by taking rather the actual
value of the reduction as the sum to be remunerated.This sum is directly
observable and renders all customers equally desirable in the eyes of the
operator. In other markets where subsidies are organized, this rule prevails.
The review does not address this point. With regard to the
remuneration issue, the Communication of 27th November 1996 only
refers to the net cost, without distinguishing the nature of the services
(geographical universal service v reductions) under provision. Belgian
law, for instance, currently uses a pure net cost approach.
Designation policy
Let us now turn to designation policy. As soon as this remuneration
concept (based on the difference between the full price and the reduced
one) is introduced, it goes without saying that all operators must have
access to all clients benefiting from these particular tariff schemes.
Without this, there would be discrimination amongst operators.
Our reasoning leads us therefore to a system of general subsidies:
under this system all consumers may choose their operator who earns
the full revenue, the fund compensating for the difference between the
full price and the reduced one. Such a system guarantees the interests of
both customers and operators.This conclusion should not astonish us, it
takes us back to the practice observed in free competitive markets.
Surprisingly, the review is not explicit on this point.
We thus consider that the subsidiarity principle should not prevail in
this practical side of the organization of reductions for the poor and the
disable. This would not affect the liberty of the member states in
deciding the field of application and the range of such reductions.
Funding policy
Within respect of the European rules, it is conceivable that a member
state might finance the entirety of its universal service from within its
own budget, without recourse to the telecommunications sector.This is
probably unlikely to happen. One could again raise here a contradiction
between the strictly budgetary considerations of a member state and the
more general concern of collective efficiency. Thus, it will be
appropriate, when the time comes, to re-examine the rationale
underlying such intra-sector financing. One feature of the
telecommunications sector, which probably justifies such a system,
would seem to be its history: public monopolies used to finance their
non-profitable activities, even paying a rent to the state.
As soon as an intra-sector financing scheme is to be set up, one has to
examine how such a scheme would be consistent with the competitive
environment.This important point is not addressed in the review. Here
again, perhaps the susidiarity principle should be questioned.
As soon as a universal service fund is set up, two issues should be
studied: the tax (or participation) rate and the fiscal base.
The tax rate
Concerning the tax rate, the concerns are its level and the point at
which it is applied.These points merit particular attention. It seems that
certain naive views could give rise to lame national systems – strong
grounds for advocating a tax rate which is known ex ante.
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A hypothetical example enables us to illustrate this point. Suppose that
the cost of universal service (to be financed from the
telecommunications sector) stands at 10. The contributive capacity –
that which we shall now call the revenue – of the (only) two operators
is 400 and 600 respectively, a total of 1000.10 The calculation for each
operator’s contribution must respect the following principles: 10 must
be effectively mobilized and in application of the principle of non-
discrimination, the contributions must be proportional to the
contributive capacities (operators participate on the basis of the
proportion of their revenue to the total revenue).These two principles
generate contributions of 4 (10 x 400/1000) and 6 (10 x 600/1000).
Superficial understanding of this mechanism might lead one to
believe, owing to the application of the two principles mentioned above,
that the contributions have been determined without any tax rate
having been fixed. A closer examination of the figures will however
reveal that each operator has been taxed at 1%, which is in fact the sum
to be financed (10), divided by the total tax base (1000).
The question now arises of just when to announce the tax rate. If the
definitive tax rate is announced after definitive computation of the net
cost of universal service, fiscal uncertainty will prevail and will weigh on
both the operators and the consumers. Such a solution is not normally
applied in fiscal matters. This uncertainty represents a hurdle to new
market entrants.
In accordance with the principle of legal security, and in order to
avoid any economic uncertainty at a time when operators are busy
making their plans (eg tariffs, production and investment policy), the tax
rate should be announced before the beginning of the accounting
exercise. Such a method does however have a downside: the rate could
have been wrongly estimated. The financing of the entirety of the
universal service by the sector itself would then not be assured.A margin
of security will thus necessarily fall to the member state budget. This
pleads in favour of correct forecasts and, in particular, of conditioning
the operator’s remuneration to provisional calculations.11
The question of the universal service tax rate is not addressed in the
review. However, there are strong arguments for enshrining the principle
of an ex ante tax rate in the new Directive (or at least that the text
should address the point of a maximum difference between provisional
and definitive tax rates).Again, in order to prevent distortionary systems,
the exercise of the subsidiarity principle in the construction of national
funding systems could be limited.
The fiscal base
Concerning the fiscal base, the question could be formulated as follows:
how to levy an indirect tax in the telecommunications sector without
distorting competition? The European Union leaves this question to the
member states. In its Communication of 27 November 1996 it stipulates
that national schemes should provide procedures for identifying clearly
the market upon which such activity is measured and determine, in a
transparent manner, the basis for contribution for each eligible
organization to contribute. The subsidiarity principle is actually
explicitly mentioned in this Communication.The review itself does not
address this question of the fiscal base. The subsidiarity
principle will thus continue to prevail in this matter.
More precise guidelines are needed in the future
universal service directive. Indeed, the question of raising an
10. The issue of the fiscal base will be
dealt with below.
11. This is not envisaged under some
national schemes.
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indirect tax in a competitive environment is not a new one. As soon as
a clear list of taxed activities is set up, one has to answer several classic
questions.Which indicator should be used as a fiscal base – a volume or
a value? If a value is chosen, is profit better (from a practical and
economic point of view) than revenue and should that be gross or net
revenue? How should double contributions be prevented? Which
territorial criterion should be applied given that several member states
are allowed to levy such a tax?
The Communication allows member states to answer these questions,
applying such principles as transparency, non-discrimination and
proportionality. Arguably the best solution is a harmonized system,
leaving to the member states the ability of fixing the tax rate level
(according to the extent of their universal service policy).12 More
precisely, it seems to us that one solution dominates:13 that of an indirect
tax (based on a list of activities), bearing on the value of transactions,
using deductions, using the actual destination of the activity as the
criterion for its attachment to a national funding scheme.14
Furthermore, the characteristics of the tax that have been evoked
above are those of value added tax (VAT).This is hardly astonishing: if the
different national indirect taxes have been replaced by VAT, this is in
virtue of those same principles. It therefore seems pertinent to study the
feasability of the following solution very seriously: the adjunction of the
universal service tax to the VAT or, in other words, an increase in VAT on
certain activities (eg voice telephony, interconnection and leased lines)
and an appropriation of the sums levied to the universal service fund.
There are several advantages to this solution. First, a new funding
mechanism need not be put together piecemeal by any member state: the
universal service fund could be immediately operational.Thus, member
states would have one less obstacle to the autonomous enactment of
universal service policy. Less subsidiarity in fiscal matters would mean
more freedom of action. The principle of proportionality, according to
which a system of financing will not be applied unless the sums to be
mobilized are significant, demonstrates sufficiently the degree to which
the construction of such a system limits the free action of the member
states.15 The absence of the fund prohibits remuneration of non-profitable
activities and thus hobbles the corrective powers of the authorities.
Furthermore, if such a harmonization were to be imposed from the
first, costly errors, such as Europe has known in the past, could be
avoided. Indeed, specific indirect taxes have over time been suppressed
in favour of the single VAT system. Let us learn from this experience not
to attempt to rewrite history.This important question of the fiscal base,
ignored in the review, should be analysed soon. A harmonized solution
would surely speed up the enaction of national universal service policies.
This idea of increasing VAT has the merit of illuminating the question
of intra-sector financing that we have already raised. Stated otherwise,
for financing universal service,would it be better to implement a specific
(applied to telephone services and networks) rise in VAT or an overall –
and therefore smaller – rise in VAT? The question will need
to be resolved in time. It clearly confronts the collectivity
with its own needs and arbitration.
An implicit choice to question 
It has been objected that budgetary realism prevents a
recourse to the general budget of the states (and thus, in
particular, an overall increase in VAT).Admitting this we may
12. For competition concerns, the tax rate
levels should however not be too
different.
13. This may be the result of an economic
reasoning which would be too technical
to be presented here.
14. This refers to deductions as in the VAT
system.
15. This principle is taken up in the 
27 November 1996 Communication.
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observe that an intermediary solution exists, a compromise between the
considerations of collective efficiency and budgetary realism.This involves
disconnecting the scope of the universal service from the fiscal base.
This implicit link between the scope and the fiscal base is not
questioned in the review. Universal service policy (related to some
specific services) could be financed by levying a tax (or a simple increase
in VAT) bearing on a more extended list of services, without touching
the economy as a whole. One would thereby have abandoned the
implicit principle of a parallel enlargement of both the scope and the
fiscal base. Convergence within the telecommunications sector also begs
for a wide fiscal base. Indeed, it will be increasingly difficult to isolate
voice telephony from certain other services.
Conclusion
The universal service issue generates many debates. On one hand,
without a considerable extension of the scope of the service, we run the
risk of developing a two-speed society, and European and national
legislations need to be highly anticipatory to avoid such a situation
developing. On the other hand, an over-ambitious universal service
policy, by weighing primarily on telecommunications operators, would
have perverse effects, and we should therefore rely on market forces to
achieve universal service objectives.
In my opinion, the universal service question cannot be subsumed
into a debate on the supposed efficacity of market forces: it is far more
a societal debate. It is for society itself to define the priorities, knowing
that, even if financed from within the telecommunications sector, a
universal service policy carries a social cost. On the other hand, member
states must have the possibility to engage different policies designed to
match their own specific national situation.
But the debate on the scope of the universal service, as presented in
the review, seems to be taking place at a time when important practical
questions have not yet been resolved. Most of these questions are not
mentioned in the review.These undecided issues risk rendering in vain
certain discussions on the enlargement of the scope itself. Actually, the
question may have to be rephrased: from the moment when a universal
service policy should really be enacted, will the instruments then in place
be ready to provide a rapid and effective response? We believe that significant
legal improvements could be made at European and national levels.
The European texts lay down the outlines of the national schemes,
leaving a large space for the exercise of subsidiarity.This principle should
be questioned. Paradoxically, as this article has shown, this liberty of
action accorded to the member states in some matters may give rise to
several problems. Thus, it suggests the introduction, in the future
directive, of some imperative rules concerning the funding policy and in
the organization of reductions.
Important steps have been taken in developing instruments that
permit member states to carry out a universal service policy. From the
moment that competition is effective, the efficiency of this policy will
be judged according to the strength of its weakest link. It seems to us
then, that a further effort of reflection must needs be undertaken at
national and European levels. To this end, the various national
experiences may serve to mutually enrich one another.Without such a
mutual effort of reflection, there is a sizeable risk that universal service
policy will either never see the light of day, or see it but faintly.
